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Key Judgments
The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) utilization of harsh ethnic control policies
coupled with extreme and violent enforcement by the People’s Armed Police (PAP) will
likely drive the Uighurs to become a security threat to the PRC and disrupt international
relationships. The Uighurs do not currently constitute a security threat to the PRC based on their
limited connection to terrorist organizations and attacks. Due to several underlying factors, the
Uighurs represent a political concern to the PRC and the conflict between the PRC and the
Uighurs is fueled by ethnic tensions. Ongoing security operations in the Uighurs’ home province
of Xinjiang exacerbate tensions as the PAP enforce harsh ethnic control policies. As the
international community is becoming increasingly aware of the situation in Xinjiang, the PRC
has come under pressure to explain its actions. These underlying forces could plausibly drive the
Uighurs to become a security threat to the PRC in the future.
Background
The Uighurs are a Chinese Ethnic-Muslim minority residing in Xinjiang, an autonomous
region that takes up one-sixth of China’s western border.2 The Uighurs have had the goal of
independence from the PRC since the PRC was formed in 1949 and this goal was significantly
hindered by the emergence of the PRC as a powerful nation-state in the early 1990s.3 The PRC
became increasingly concerned with Uighur separatist movements following the collapse of the
Soviet Union in 1991 and the subsequent independence of Central Asian States.4 This time
period was also marked by PRC fears of the viability of the communist system.
To maintain a strong, unified communist nation, the PRC has deeply embedded the
concept of “One China”.5 Any strong minority identity threatens the PRC’s views of “One
China”. In order to foster a strong and unified China, the PRC has a multi-level system in which
individual citizens are always expected to play a role in promoting the PRC and controlling
dissent by remaining loyal to the PRC and the government’s decisions.6 In all regions, the PRC
tends to respond to domestic hostilities that threaten this loyalty system with oppressive policies
that force assimilation as well as the direct force of the PAP.7
In Xinjiang, the PRC has been utilizing counterterrorism operations in order to control
the Uighur population. The PRC asserted a link on 29 November 2001 between Uighur members
of the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and Osama bin Laden and the Taliban in an
officially released party document.8 In 2002, the ETIM was officially declared a terrorist group
through United States (US) Executive Order 13224 and United Nations (UN) Security Council
Resolutions 1267 and 1390 which justified the PRC’s assertion.9 This official recognition later
caused confusion as to the true threat posed by the Uighurs to the PRC.
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Analysis
The Uighurs do not currently constitute a serious threat to the PRC’s stability. In order to
be considered a serious threat, a party must have high levels of both intent and capabilities.10 The
Uighurs have high levels of intention as a separatist threat, but relatively low levels of intention
of causing physical harm to the PRC. Regardless, the PRC has currently diminished the Uighur’s
capabilities to pose a threat to the PRC’s homeland security. PRC intelligence and security forces
have successfully kept Uighur separatist forces from effectively organizing any sort of resistance
inside or outside of China through collaboration efforts with other nations in Central Asia as well
as domestic counterterrorism operations.11 The few existing dangerous Uighur groups lack the
coordination and sophistication needed to make significant progress towards their goals of
causing harm to the PRC, due to the extreme policing and political oversight of the Xinjiang
region.
The conflict in Xinjiang between the Uighurs and the PRC is one fueled primarily by
ethnic tensions. The Uighurs have not positively benefited the same way as the Han Chinese
majority has from the PRC’s efforts to modernize and improve life in Xinjiang. Economic
disparity is driving ethnic unrest, as the Uighurs are unwelcome, underpaid, and underemployed
in their own region.12 The PRC’s “Great Leap West” in 1999 prompted tens of thousands of Han
citizens to emigrate to Xinjiang in order to take advantage of government-funded economic
expansion; taking jobs and positions away from the Uighurs.13 Many Uighurs reside in poorer
rural areas, relying on low paying jobs in dangerous or unsubsidized fields.14 Such
modernization efforts in Xinjiang has prompted the idea amongst Uighurs that their culture is
being targeted by the central government and the Xinjiang region is no longer their own.
Divisions along ethnic lines in multiple areas of life have continued to drive a wedge between the
PRC and the Uighurs in Xinjiang (See Outside-In Chart in Appendix B).
The PRC’s political actions in
Xinjiang began by focusing primarily on
homogenizing the Chinese culture within the
region, but the underlying ethnic unrest
labeled the Uighurs as a security threat to the
PRC. The Uighurs became increasingly
discontented by PRC policies that oppressed
Uighur culture and the PRC continued to
create such policies with the intention of
homogenizing the culture and mitigating the
external separatist threat. As tensions within
the region grew, the PRC began to become
concerned with the possible relationship
between the Uighurs and Islamic Terrorist
Groups (ITGs). This concern was fueled by
Figure 2: Nations Neighboring Xinjiang.
the geographic position of Xinjiang in
relation to Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern countries that tend to have cells of Al-Qaeda and
the Islamic State (IS); potentially allowing for the easy exit and return of radicalized Uighur
foreign fighters (Figure 2: Nations Neighboring Xinjiang.15).16
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The PRC viewing the Uighurs as a threat to their national security has exacerbated
Uighur tensions. The core conflict between the PRC and the Uighurs is due to a self-perpetuating
conflict over harsh control policies and the PRC’s treatment of Uighurs in the Xinjiang region
(See R2: Central Conflict Loop in Appendix A). Examples of such policies include laws against
speaking Turkish and dressing in traditional Uighur garments; aimed at forcing the assimilation
of Uighurs into Chinese culture.17 The more control policies and actions taken by the PRC in the
region, the greater the level of discontent amongst Uighurs and the greater the chances of dissent
within the region. This dynamic between the PRC and the Uighurs creates a vicious cycle as the
actions of dissent are met with harsher control policies and other actions by the PRC that create
an even more hostile environment.
The PRC does not differentiate between non-violent and violent political actions against
the central government’s policies and responds to all acts of discontent amongst citizens with
counterterrorism forces.18 The PRC links “terrorist activities” to any actions, attempted actions,
or goals that “undermine public security”; which is a considerably broad definition and a large
departure from the type of actions that would be considered terrorist actions in the US and other
Western nations.19 The discontent in Xinjiang over the previously mentioned ethnic control
policies introduces a third actor in the region, the People’s Armed Police (PAP). The PAP is a
paramilitary PRC force responsible for security within the borders of China as well as law
enforcement and preventative actions within the troubled regions they are deployed to.20
The self-perpetuating conflict in Xinjiang between the Uighurs and the PRC causes the
Uighurs to be ethnically targeted in two ways via the acting force of the PAP. The first method
of ethnic targeting occurs via direct conflict with the PAP. PRC law gives the PAP the right to
act as a police force when deployed into a certain region and to “control” certain people or
groups when acting officers of the PAP deem it to be necessary.21 In Xinjiang, the PAP has
consistently utilized military level force to control the populations of Uighurs without making a
discrimination between Uighur activists peacefully protesting and Uighur activists involved in
riots within capital cities.22 In December 2017, over 10,000 PAP officers were deployed to a
rally in Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capitol, which was intended to be peaceful and led to the arrest of
many protestors.23
The second method of ethnic targeting occurs via the PAP’s digital Integrated Joint
Operations Platform (IJOP) and impacts all Uighurs in Xinjiang regardless of their participation
in any acts of dissension. IJOP is a growing PAP database that aggregates extreme amounts of
data collected on Uighurs such as family history, biological data, online messaging interactions,
and recorded daily behaviors.24 The PAP has multiple sources for the collection of this data from
CCTV cameras with facial recognition, existing Uighur legal records, and Wi-Fi scanning
systems.25 There are 31,000 convenience police stations in urban areas of Xinjiang since 2016
that enable the collection of this data and serve as security checkpoints which require Uighurs to
place smartphones on a sensor in order to collect all the data from the phone.26 The aggregated
data is utilized for predictive policing in order to flag individual Uighurs as potential threats to
PRC and PAP control.27
Both direct PAP force and PAP predictive policing in Xinjiang even further exacerbate
Uighur tensions in the region. Actions done by the PAP in Xinjiang represent the direct
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enforcement of the ethnic control policies that drove the conflict between the PRC and the
Uighurs in the first place. The large-scale surveillance of Xinjiang further intensifies Uighur
sentiments of ethnic oppression as the PAP utilizes IJOP flagged individuals to target these
individuals before they have even violated an ethnic policy or displayed any signs of disloyalty
to the PRC.28
An unexpected consequence of the PRC’s broad definition of terrorism and strict
dissension policies is that the Uighurs ironically became more vulnerable to sympathizing with
and joining ITGs than they were before (See Background Shift Analysis in Honors Appendix
1).29 The PRC first made the connection between the Uighurs and terrorism in 2001, years prior
to the first Uighur linked terrorist attack on the PRC’s homeland.30 ITGs are also inclined to
support Uighurs in Xinjiang due to the PRC’s attacks against the Muslim faith in
counterterrorism laws as profession of the Muslim faith outside of very few government
sanctioned religious outlets is considered “illegal religious activity”.31
The stringent counterterrorism policies that ethnically target Uighurs were eventually
followed by terrorist attacks on the PRC’s homeland that were connected to ITGs. Before the
2008 Beijing Olympics, the Minister of Public Security for the PRC expelled 4,000 to 5,000
Uighurs from Beijing over fear that there would be a terrorist attack on the games.32 This
prompted the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), an Al-Qaeda splinter group, to release a video
claiming that Uighur fighters would attack the PRC and the Olympics due to harsh treatment.33
Following these events, the PRC began to experience larger and more frequent terrorist attacks
on their mainland that were accredited to Uighurs as parts of universally known ITGs. Uighur
foreign fighters were linked to several ITG claimed attack on China in the 2013-2015 time
period. The most extreme being September 2014’s bomb attacks and clashes that killed 50
people and injured 50 people.34
The Uighurs still do not currently pose a major terrorist threat to the PRC, though this
connection between ITGs and Uighurs has grown as a result of the self-perpetuating ethnic
conflict between the PRC and the Uighurs. Uighurs tend to participate in “disparate
organizations” of ITGs with “differing goals” which makes it less probable that one larger,
global ITG would maintain a continued interest in the region.35 Uighur utilization of terrorism
against the PRC is currently hamstrung and aimed more at the goal of political autonomy in
response to ethnic oppression.36 This goal does not align with the main goal of the ITGs;
establishing a global caliphate of Islamic rule.37
Without a major terrorist threat stemming from Uighurs in Xinjiang, the PRC’s claims
that harsh control measures within the region are necessary to maintain order and protect their
homeland security are not justifiable.38 Human rights groups, such as Amnesty International,
Human Rights Watch, and the World Uighur Congress, have continuously been filing protests
with Western governments and international organizations over the PRC’s treatment of Uighurs
for years. The PRC has thwarted this attention in the past by justifying their actions based on
necessary counterterrorism operations but is no longer able to do so (See B8: PRC CT
Operations Justifications in Appendix A).
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Pressure has recently been put on the PRC to give a better explanation for their actions
which has invited more international attention to the situation in Xinjiang (See B6: UN Responds
to Human Rights Violations and B7: PRC Unwanted International Attention in Appendix A). In
2018, the UN and other international organizations began to call attention to apparent human
right violations in Xinjiang based on PAP actions and ethnic control policies.39 Threats of
sanctions and diplomatic warnings have been utilized as tools to apply more pressure on the
PRC. International pressure is currently mounting against the PRC as little action has been taken
by the PRC to prove that they are not violating human rights. The PRC attempted to alleviate
suspicions by welcoming delegations from multiple countries into the region in December 2018
and January 2019, however this increased suspicions.40

Figure 3: Satellite Imagery Showing the Appearance of Re-Education Camps.
Re-education camps in Xinjiang has emerged at the current forefront of international
attention to the PRC’s alleged human rights violations. The Uighurs who have been detained by
the PAP are being sent indefinitely to camps which were revealed via satellite imagery (Figure
3: Satellite Imagery Showing the Appearance of Re-Education Camps41).42 The PRC claims are
centers to reduce Islamic extremism by vocational training and teaching detainees traditional
PRC concepts, dress, language, and law for better assimilation.43 Many US and European
newspapers have referred to re-education camps in Xinjiang as “concentration camps”.44 Many
nations and international human rights groups have called for a formal US investigation into the
region, but the investigation has either not been completed or has not yet been publicized.
The current status-quo of the Uighur situation in Xinjiang is unsustainable. The future of
the situation in Xinjiang will likely be driven by the extent to which ITGs and terrorism are
involved in the conflict, the PRC’s perception of control over the region, and the extent to which
the Uighur situation is visible to the international community (See Divergent Scenario
Development in Appendix D). Currently, the conflict in Xinjiang is in a transitional period and
there are a few possibilities for how the situation will evolve out to about 2023.
The most plausible future for the Uighur – PRC conflict is the Uighurs becoming a
security threat to the PRC by freedom fighter movements. The lack of direct involvement by
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ITGs in Xinjiang coupled with international awareness of PRC human rights violations create an
environment in which the PRC faces damaged international relationships and sanctions against
it. The PRC faces international sanctions based on many issues and could potentially utilize the
alleviation of forces and release of prisoners in Xinjiang to divert attention from other sanctions
aimed at controlling the PRC’s economic and cyber actions.45 The continued lack of proof that
ITGs are directly involved within the Uighur population makes it difficult for the PRC to explain
their actions in Xinjiang. The Uighur population, however, has grown to be more vulnerable to
large scale resistance movements and ITG tactics based upon the past twenty years of massive
oppression operations by the PRC. The freedom fighter movement could also gain traction by the
release of the around one million prisoners who have likely faced the worst human rights
violations inside the re-education camps.46
An alternative future for the Uighur – PRC that has a lower probability, but a higher
impact is a radicalized Xinjiang as Uighurs could turn to ITGs for support. The environment
would be similar to the one in the previous future with one major difference, ITGs are now
directly involved in the conflict. The underlying ethno-religious tension in Xinjiang combined
with the highly oppressive actions taken by the PRC in Xinjiang create a vulnerability in Uighurs
to look to ITGs for support in the conflict which could be multiplied if the PRC pulls back
security in the region. Xinjiang is geographically situated in a way that could create the
conditions necessary for ITG cells to form within the region.47 ITGs could take advantage of this
opportunity because it would give them greater access to destabilize a non-Islamic government
that is a strong nation state unlike the ones terrorist cells typically exist within.48 This future
scenario would plausibly be highly chaotic due to past underlying confusion as to the true nature
of ITG involvement within Xinjiang and current focus on the PRC’s actions. Though highly
impactful, this scenario is not very plausible given the lack of connection between ITGs and the
Uighurs especially in the group’s differing motives.
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Conclusion
A common theme emerging from the analysis is that the PRC is driving the Uighur issue
forward. The PRC in recent years has been justifying the utilization of extreme counterterrorism
in Xinjiang as a necessary step in reducing terrorist attacks aimed at their homeland as well as
reducing the number and reach of global terrorist networks. The backlash against these policies
are taken by the PRC as Western propaganda that is designed to damage US-China relations and
the true extent to which Uighurs are unfairly prosecuted has somewhat been concealed until
recently.49
•

There is a moderate level of confidence in the analytical conclusions generated in this
capstone project as they were well supported by multiple analytic methodologies as well
as background research.

•

There is a moderate level of confidence in the sources utilized in this analysis due to
the nature of China as a research target. The PRC has a high level of control over
journalists, political researchers, and reports coming from the region which can impact
the information reported to the public. We were also limited in the sources that could be
read as neither of us can read Chinese.
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Appendix A: Causal Analysis
Causal analysis is used to illustrate connections between actors with differing strategies
which can highlight relationships between them and unexpected consequences of these
interactions. Casual loop diagraming is a causal analysis methodology that focuses on creating a
Causal Loop Diagram (CLD) to illustrate the mental models of the main actors in a system as
well as the ways in which these mental models connect with one another.
Causal Loop Diagram

Figure 4: Causal Forces Influencing the Situation in Xinjiang.
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Causal Loops Mentioned in the Paper

Figure 5: The Central Conflict (R2).
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Figure 6: UN Responds to Human Rights Violations (B6).

Figure 7: PRC Justification of CT Operations (B8).
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Figure 8: PRC Unwanted International Attention (B7).
Causal Loop Stories
Actor Mental Models
(B1) PRC: Han Superiority
For decades, the Han ethnic majority has dominated many aspects of Chinese life. The
Chinese Communist Party utilizes and solidifies this through use of the “Zhonghua Minzu”
(Chinese Nation) system, which encourages the idea of a single Chinese unity. Minzu
encourages the idea that minorities are backward people who need Han assistance in order to
move forward. To the Han central government, control over territories like Xinjiang will slip
once the Han start losing their cultural supremacy. To counter this, the government imposes
ethnic control policies that restrict the cultural freedom of the minority groups in China. Once
the control policies take effect, Han superiority goes back up.
(B2) PRC: Regional Stability
The PRC also has a political goal for controlling their minority populations. For example, a
prevented uprising in Xinjiang dissuades political dissidents in Tibet from trying something
similar. A loss of regional stability decreases the PRC’s control over their territory. The PRC
then implements its ethnic control policies in order to drive down ethnic feelings that don’t
line up with the Minzu beliefs. Regional stability goes back up once the ethnic feelings are
suppressed.
(B3) PRC: People’s Armed Police
The PRC has more tools available besides “soft” policy changes. The People’s Armed Police
(PAP) stand ready to deploy and assist local police in suppressing dissent. As stability drops,
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the PAP begins to carry out more missions to decrease the frequency of dissenting actions. As
the acts of dissent occur less frequently, the stability of the region increases.
(B4) Violent Uighur Separatist Movements
Some Uighurs feel that more extreme action is needed to get what they want. Uighur separatist
groups have similar aims to their “non-violent” countrymen, but attempt to achieve them in
extremely different ways. To them, more dissenters come about as the discontent rises. This
leads to an increase in the frequency of violent political actions (riots, bombings, etc.).
Eventually, the Uighurs will gain more political autonomy, which decreases the discontent.
(B5) Non-Violent Uighur Independence Groups
The Uighurs don’t agree with the ethnic control policies and police actions being pressed upon
them and look for ways to gain cultural autonomy. As the degree of discontent among the
Uighurs increases, there are more people who feel like something needs to change. The more
people that are involved in non-violent political movements, the more likely it is that political
action (protests, working within the system, etc.) will take place. Ideally, the Uighurs’ use of
non-violent political action will cause an increase in their cultural autonomy. This increase in
cultural autonomy lowers the discontent that the Uighurs feel.
B6: UN: Respond to Human Rights Violations
The United Nations (UN) has a rigid stance on human rights. If a member nation breaks these
rules, there are serious repercussions on the international stage. As there are more instances of
human rights violations in the country, more people flee the country as political refugees. The
more political refugees there are, the more likely it is that the international community
becomes aware that violations are taking place. This increased awareness prompts the
international community to start applying pressure on the violating country, through economic
sanctions or other political tools. Ideally, this would lower the number of instances of human
rights violations in the country.
(R1) ITG: Recruitment
Islamic Terrorist Groups (ITG) broadly include groups such as the Islamic State (or ISIS), Al
Qaeda, and the Taliban. The common motivation for the actors studied in this loop would be to
establish a global caliphate through violent means. ITGs fit into the broader picture of the
Uighur - PRC conflict because they utilize the tension felt by the Uighur Islamic minority as a
recruitment tactic to increase their number of sympathizers and attacks that can be claimed as
part of their missions. ITGs are focused on their degree of influence on a global scale.
Influence campaigns, such as on social media, increase the popularity of the ITG and gives
them access to more fighters. The more fighters the ITG has; the more terrorist attacks they
can perpetuate and claim. This ultimately creates a reinforcing diagram as the degree of
influence as increases which further perpetuates their recruitment model. The reinforcing
dynamic goes back to the initial motivation of the group in that they will not stop until they
have achieved a global caliphate.
Interactions
(B7) PRC: Unwanted International Pressure
Islamic Terrorist Groups (ITG) broadly include groups such as the Islamic State (or ISIS), Al
Qaeda, and the Taliban. The common motivation for the actors studied in this loop would be to
establish a global caliphate through violent means. ITGs fit into the broader picture of the
Uighur - PRC conflict because they utilize the tension felt by the Uighur Islamic minority as a
recruitment tactic to increase their number of sympathizers and attacks that can be claimed as
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part of their missions. ITGs are focused on their degree of influence on a global scale.
Influence campaigns, such as on social media, increase the popularity of the ITG and gives
them access to more fighters. The more fighters the ITG has; the more terrorist attacks they
can perpetuate and claim. This ultimately creates a reinforcing diagram as the degree of
influence as increases which further perpetuates their recruitment model. The reinforcing
dynamic goes back to the initial motivation of the group in that they will not stop until they
have achieved a global caliphate.
(B8) PRC: CT Operation Justification
This loop is the interaction between the PRC, the Islamic Terrorists Groups (ITGs), and the
UN which creates a dynamic in which the PRC can leverage the involvement of ITGs in order
to justify counterterrorism operations. The main interaction occurs when the frequency of
terrorist attacks (or terrorist threats) on China’s homeland increases the frequency of acts of
dissension on China’s homeland which decreases China’s regional stability. This creates a
visible terrorist threat allowing China to justify harsher counterterrorism measures and lessen
the degree of international pressure created in the B7: PRC: Unwanted International Pressure
loop in order to act against ITGs. The PRC then utilizes the ethnic control policies as
counterterrorism policies in order to act against the frequency of terrorist attacks claimed by
ITGs. When labeled as counterterrorism policies targeted against a globally perceived threat,
the PRC is able to justify their harsher control policies.
(R2) Central Conflict
The central conflict regarding the Uighur situation occurs between the PRC, the PAP, and both
the violent Uighur separatist movements and nonviolent Uighur independence groups.
Generally, the Uighur population perceives the PRC’s ethnic control policies and the PAP’s
actions as instances of human rights violations targeted at them; increasing the degree of
discontent amongst them. Uighurs who make the decision to act on these typically join either
violent or nonviolent groups as seen in the B4 and B4 loops which end in political actions that
are either violent or nonviolent. Both types of actions by Uighur groups are viewed as
dissension by the PRC and often the PRC has trouble discerning when the political action is a
violent threat which explains why the two different types of movements end up fueling the
same conflict. As the acts of dissension increase, the overall regional stability decreases which
directly activates PAP actions and simultaneously decreased the PRC’s control over the
Xinjiang territory which creates the need for more ethnic control policies. These actions by the
PRC and the PAP then feed back into the instances of human rights violations; continuously
agitating the conflict. As the cycle continues and the degree of discontent continually raises
amongst the Uighurs, more Uighurs will join either type of group.
(R3) ITG: Leveraging PRC-Uighur Conflict
This loop regards the interest that ITGs would have in the PRC-Uighur conflict. Since Uighurs
who subscribe to the violent separatist movements are a Muslim population acting out against
a non-Muslim ruling government through a violent manner, the number of dissenters are
increasing the popularity of ITGs which in turn feeds into the ITG recruitment cycle. The
struggle Uighurs face against the PRC can be leveraged by ITGs as propaganda through
influence operations which can inspire more dissenters within the Uighur population.
(R4) ITG: Uighur Foreign Fighters
This loop regards the external support the violent Uighur separatist movements receive from
ITGs. When Uighur dissenters look outwards towards ITGs, the popularity of the ITG rises
within the violent Uighur population. At this point, dissenters can leave Xinjiang and become
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fighters for various ITGs in various Middle Eastern nations. After a time delay, usually one or
two years, the Uighurs whom became ITG fighters can return to Xinjiang and contribute the
violent political actions. In turn, the radicalized foreign fighters who return to Xinjiang further
agitate the population of violent Uighurs. This generates more discontent and more popularity
of the ITGs; inspiring more Uighurs to leave to gain training at ITG camps. The ITG Uighur
Foreign Fighters model is a reinforcing causal system because it works to continually raise the
amount of fighters and dissenters and contains no balancing mechanism.
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Appendix B: Outside-In Analysis
Outside-In thinking is used to frame subjects within a broader context. Looking into
other areas besides the main “theme” adds to the background information surrounding the issue.
In this project, the Uighur issue might be classified as a security problem, but the deep cultural
aspect of the issue hits upon many different domains. Researching and analyzing the issue from
the point of view of religion, economics, sociology, and demographics could help provide a
better picture of the issue. Completing an Outside-In analysis added to the understanding of the
main issue. Examining potential reasons for the Uighur problem through other subjects, such as
economics and environmental, aided in viewing the main problem through a new light.
Most Prominent Factor: The Political Sphere
➢ The Uighurs impact the PRC’s politics on both an international and domestic level. On
the domestic level, the PRC relies heavily on national unity according to a “Minzu
System”; a system in which all ethnic minorities coexist peacefully with the majority to
make up one strong unified China. The PRC diverts contentious issues towards local
administrations in order to increase a sense of individual responsibility. This creates a
multilevel system in which citizens who are loyal to the PRC are expected to play a
role in promoting the government and controlling dissent.
➢ On the international level, the PRC mainly relies on the idea of “realpolitik” in order to
serve the nation’s interests. As a Confucian society, the PRC will often overlook
religious differences in order to forge a connection with Islamic countries in the East
based off the PRC’s goal to keep Western Christian influence out of the Eastern
sphere. The PRC also has the goal of maintaining non-confrontational relationships
with bordering countries and five out of the fourteen of these countries are Muslimmajority.
➢ The Uighurs impact the domestic political system because they typically do not
identify as a loyal minority to China and they demand separation. This diminishes the
internal cohesion that the PRC seeks in domestic politics. PRC suppression of the
Uighurs, as a Muslim minority, impact the international system by contradicting the
cooperative relationship the PRC attempts to build with Muslim nations.
2nd Most Prominent Factor: The Economical Sphere
➢ Xinjiang is an economic powerhouse for China. Xinjiang is the country’s biggest
producer of oil, natural gas, and cotton, among other products, which make the central
government extremely interested in maintaining control over the region. However, the
economic success of the region is not shared evenly between the Han majority and
other ethnic groups and leads to more ethnic tensions.
➢ Xinjiang has large natural stores of natural gas, coal, and other minerals, which is
greatly desired by the developed eastern part of the country. Much of the province also
relies on an agriculturally-based economy, predominantly cotton. In turn, the Uighurs
mainly work in these industries. Economic problems arise for the Uighurs in these
fields, as the government is attempting to limit coal production to decrease pollution
and water scarcity causes huge issues for the cotton industry. The government
attempts to provide subsidies for these industries, but many farmers and miners feel
that the given funds are not enough.
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➢ Due to the issues in Xinjiang’s main industries and the general under-development of
the region, the Chinese government attempted a massive investment campaign to
modernize the region’s industry and living conditions in 1999. Overall, many residents
of Xinjiang feel the benefits of this initiative, as living conditions have greatly
improved across the board in the cities. The problem is, many Han Chinese have
immigrated to Xinjiang to participate in the economic growth. In turn, they are the
ones who have felt most of the benefits. Many Uighurs struggle to compete for jobs
and still rely on less prosperous jobs in the countryside. This further proves to the
Uighurs that the Han majority are favored in China and further exacerbates the ethnic
tensions.
➢ The environment has suffered in Xinjiang due to decades of resource exploitation and
poor management. Poorer Uighurs in particular suffer from smog, poor water quality
and supply, and radiation exposure, among other problems. This environmental
degradation, when combined with the poverty many Uighurs live in, greatly increases
the ethnic tensions in the region, as the Han have better employment and do not feel
the negative environmental effects as strongly.
3rd Most Prominent Sphere: The Military Sphere
➢ Xinjiang is militarily important to China due to border control, maintaining the status
quo, and regional dominance. Xinjiang contains a very large portion of China’s
Western border and acts as a buffer region to Central Asia. Exerting control over the
region serves the double purpose of maintaining the “ethnic unity” of China and
keeping China’s strategic options open in Eurasia.
➢ The border of Xinjiang spans across a wide area, touching Mongolia, Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and several other countries. If Xinjiang attempts to gain more autonomy or
independence, Beijing could lose access to all those borders, as well as the buffer zone
that Xinjiang provides. If a crisis were to emerge at one of the borders, the Chinese
army would have problems accessing troubled areas.
➢ The central government also has concerns with ethnic unity that center around
Xinjiang. The Uighurs represent one of the more vocal ethnic minorities in China,
which concerns Beijing. If such feelings of “nationalism” or ethnic tensions spread to
other areas, like Tibet, the government would have a large amount of issues to handle
across the country. The government has handled ethnic or separatist issues with
military force in the past. A countrywide military crackdown would have devastating
repercussions for China on the international stage.
4th Most Prominent Sphere: Religion
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➢ The PRC is ideologically linked to Confucian, Buddhist, and Taoist religions. China is
an atheistic state with worshipping communities mostly being linked to different local
saints with no unified. This type of community worship differs greatly from that of
other religions in which the focus is on a higher power(s). The PRC values science and
communism as truths over religion; it has long held the belief that religion breads
gullibility and superstition. Those who associate with the traditional practices of China
believe religion is more so a way of living life, rather than being a theological
construct.
➢ The Uighurs are of predominantly Islamic faith and hold to traditional Islamic views.
This creates a religious clash with the PRC and breeds tension. Though the PRC has
attempted to show that they align with Islamic religions, Uighurs believe that they are
religiously oppressed by Chinese rule.
➢ The factor of religion, however, does not really dominate the discontent the Uighurs
have with the PRC. Though religion fuels the tension, the conflict does not revolve
around it. Instead, religion can is mostly construed as an ideological weapon to achieve
foundationally nationalistic goals.

5th Most Prominent Sphere: The Geographical Sphere
➢ Xinjiang covers one-sixth of China’s territory and a large portion of the Western
border. The autonomous region borders eight different countries and is integral in
cultural and economic exchanges occurring across the border between the East and the
West. Through Pakistan, Xinjiang has access to the Arabian Sea which is key in
transporting goods and oil. Xinjiang also has access to railways, pipelines, and roads
that are crucial to China’s New Silk and Road Initiative.
➢ Xinjiang is important in 3 main goals of the PRC: border stability, stopping separatism,
and access to key energy resources. China historically places a lot of value on
“territorial unity” and believes that strong control over all of their territory will keep
the nation strong. Xinjiang is also an important aspect of the PRC’s “geographic
contiguity”: a concept that allows China to expand political and economic ties with
Central Asian nations. This plan is highly contingent on Xinjiang bordering three
Central Asian republics and historically remaining in good relations with these
republics.
➢ Uighur militancy or separatist actions in Xinjiang is of concern to the PRC due to the
importance of Xinjiang in the PRC’s strategic plans.
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Appendix C: Red Team Analysis
Red team analysis is a method utilized when an issue needs to be understood from the
perspective of an adversary. The method requires that the analyst view the issues as though they
were analyzing it for the adversary’s leader or decision maker.50 This method can be utilized to
give multiple interpretations of an issue and understand other forces or dynamics driving the
issue forward. Official red team analysis is typically conducted by a cell of analysts within an
agency that solely view issues from the perspective of the adversary.51Red team analysis was
adapted to this project by flipping the first two methodologies to be from the perspective of PRC
as well as researching and identifying how the PRC tends to make political decisions. This
methodology was utilized to challenge assumptions and conclusions made in other
methodologies and provide a more complete picture of the many different sides of the issue.
Causal Analysis from PRC’s Perspective
 Chinese political decision-making revolves around their belief of cultural superiority.
International law and minority rights are secondary to the security and stability of the
state. Chinese officials likely view this system with a focus on loops B8 and B7.
 The PRC’s goal is to legitimize their domestic counterterrorism operations and
subsequently their ethnic policies. In recent years, China’s CT operations have come
under international scrutiny as more Uighurs flee China with reports of human rights
violations (Loop B7). Beijing has been forced into a balancing act, where they strive to
maintain their domestic security while limiting diplomatic pressure from Western
countries. As more terrorist attacks occur on Chinese soil, the more ammunition
Beijing has to justify their counterterrorism methodologies to the rest of the world
(Loop B8).
Outside In Analysis from PRC’s Perspective
 The PRC tends to be focused primarily on the political dominance of the Han Chinese
ethnic majority. Within the outside-in domains for looking at the Uighur problem, it is
likely that the PRC would focus heavily on the political domain considering the
perceived threat a culturally immersed minority would pose towards the Han majority.
As a sub-category to the political sphere, the PRC as an atheist state likely views the
religious domain as a factor that divides the Uighur minority from the Han majority.
The PRC also has the political goal of maintaining non-confrontational relationships
with Islamic minorities in order to maintain non-confrontational relationships with
bordering Islamic nations. In order to overcome this discrepancy, the PRC can either
focus heavily on ethnic control policies unrelated to religion or on broader security
concerns.
 When national unity cannot be achieved through political means, the conflict with the
Uighurs becomes a greater threat that the PRC. The Xinjiang region is significant in
connecting the PRC to bordering nations; giving it both military and economic
significance. Unrest or uprisings within the Xinjiang region constitute the involvement
of the People’s Armed Police to maintain territorial control. At the point that the
People’s Armed Police gets involved, the conflict between the Uighurs and the PRC
then gets classified within the central government as a terrorist conflict and suppression
tactics follow from here.
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The Uighurs from the Perspective of the PRC
The Uighurs represent a serious security threat to the PRC due to their connection with Islamic
extremist groups, non-Han identity, and positioning in Xinjiang. Uighur extremist targeting of
soft civilian populations has largely increased along with their affiliation with Middle Eastern
terrorist organizations such as ISIS or Al-Qaeda since 2013.52 Uighur minority uprisings threaten
the central government’s ability to maintain unity and order through one strong, unified China.53
It is also possible that any uprising in Xinjiang of a nationalistic manner could inspire other
minorities in other regions, such as Tibet, to do the same.
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Appendix D: Divergent Scenario Development
Divergent scenario development is a futures analysis method utilized to generate a range
of plausible future scenarios for an issue or topic. The method works by identifying three
prominent causal drivers from causal analysis and two possible endpoints that the drivers could
go to in the imagined future. These drivers and endpoints can be seen on Figure 9 below. After
the drivers and endpoints are identified, there are eight plausible future scenarios for the issue
analyzed based upon different combinations of end points. All eight scenarios are explained in an
additional chart by stories generated by the analyst on how the future would look with the three
specific endpoints. For this capstone project, divergent scenario development was useful in
identifying major themes for the future of the Uighur situation in Xinjiang since it was already
apparent that the issue was not going to remain the same. Divergent scenario development aided
in identifying a plausible future for the conflict as well as alternatives to pay attention to.
Divergent scenario development was also useful in identifying implications.
Divergent Scenario Chart

Figure 9: Divergent Scenario Chart.
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Divergent Scenario Stories
Scenario 1: “China’s Hidden Intentions”
Islamic Terrorist Groups (ITGs) have been actively engaging in attacks within Chinese
borders, especially in Xinjiang. Beijing isn’t concerned about these or their effects on national
stability and moves troops into Xinjiang to deal with the ITG cells. Beijing continues to keep a
tight lid on social media use by Uighur civilians, however, and uses the extra forces in
Xinjiang to continue to implement the PRC’s ethnic control policies without the rest of the
world knowing.
Scenario 2: “China Plays the Terrorism Card”
*Most Unprepared For: The international community is aware of the PRC’s actions against
the Uighurs in Xinjiang and confronts Beijing on the international stage. Beijing is not fazed
by this, as the frequent ITG terrorist attacks on Chinese soil more than justify heavy handed
means to ensure the country’s stability.
Scenario 3: “China’s Worst Nightmare”
It is not a good day to be in Beijing. ITGs are carrying out frequent attacks in China and the
international community is applying pressure over the PRC’s treatment of the Uighurs.
Rumblings of discontent with the government have spread beyond Xinjiang and the
government is worried that they are looking at the beginnings of a major crisis.
Scenario 4: Radical Xinjiang
*Most Dangerous: Fighting between ITGs and the PRC’s forces have led to a massive swing
in public opinion against Beijing. Uighurs begin siding with ITGs and local secessionist
groups as separatist feelings sweep across the region. The PRC has been able to lock down
social media usage about the Uighurs’ treatment for now but fears of the radicalization
spreading are prominent in Beijing.
Scenario 5: “Business as Usual
Not too much has changed regarding the Uighur - PRC conflict. The PRC was able to suppress
media usage and redirect international attention in order to continue their ethnic control efforts
in Xinjiang. The ITGs continue to show indirect involvement in the conflict with little on the
ground support.
Scenario 6: “China’s Relationship Crisis”
An international spotlight on the PRC’s treatment of the Uighurs causes massive tension in the
PRC’s relationships with both neighboring Muslim countries and western nations. As the PRC
continues to perceive themselves as stable, their ethnic control policies and counterterrorism
operations are way over the line in regards the Uighur’s human rights. The PRC continues to
face little existential threat from ITGs and has no way to justify their policies to the
international community. The PRC experiences a strong economic and political pushback as
more and more countries cease trade with the nation.
Scenario 7: China’s Paranoia
*Most Likely: Despite no direct involvement from ITGs, the PRC continues to perceive
activities in Xinjiang as a direct existential threat to their countries and carries out strong
ethnic control and counterterrorism measures in order to control the Uighurs. There harsh
policies cause the PRC to experience harsher human rights sanctions and slowly deteriorates
the PRC’s relationships with Western and bordering countries. Meanwhile, the PRC slowly
loses political control expending resources on controlling a non-issue.
Scenario 8: “Black Mirror”
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Xinjiang arises as a police state with Uighur citizens living similar to those in North Korea.
With extreme technical resources deployed towards controlling the lives of Xinjiang’s citizens,
all Uighurs are virtually forced within the confines of the Xinjiang region with no external
help or international outreach. The PRC is able to suppress the international community's
awareness of the Xinjiang police state. At this point, there is little direct involvement from
ITGs as it would not even be possible for them to cross over the border in Xinjiang or reach
Uighurs via the media.
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Honors Appendix 1: Bridget Read
My honors component is comprised of three specific intelligence analysis methods that
were identified as necessary throughout the intelligence analysis capstone but did not fit the
scope and time constraints of the original project. This honors appendix is divided into three
parts: background shift analysis, decision significance comparison, and key assumptions check.
Each of the three pieces introduces the method, displays the method, and provides a conclusion
as to how the method was used. All three methods were used to supplement and re-analyze the
main methods used in formulating key judgments within the scope of the IA capstone report.
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Background Shift Analysis
Background shift analysis is a causal analysis method that can be utilized to identify how
an agent’s actions contributed to a potential unexpected consequence. The method first requires
establishing the time period that the consequence existed in and a time period before the problem
existed. The two time periods are than compared to each other to identify how the later time
period with the unexpected consequence differs from the time period without the unexpected
consequence. Next, the agent’s actions are examined for how they may have contributed to
current environment with the consequence. These results are used to decide whether or not the
agent’s actions could have caused the unexpected consequence.
Background Shift Analysis Method:
The Agent

The People’s Republic of China

The Problem
Possible unexpected
consequence

Uighur acts of religiously motivated terrorism and
strengthened connection to Islamic Terrorist Groups (ISIS,
Al Qaeda, Taliban)

Step 1: Later Time of
Problem
With the consequence

Late 2000s - Current

Step 2: Time Before Problem
Without consequence

Late 1980s - Late 1990s

Step 3: The Shift
How the later background (the
causes with effect) differs from
the earlier background (cases
without effect)

* From 2008 on, the PRC experiences more legitimate
terrorist attacks on their homeland
* ITGs begin to utilize Uighurs and Xinjiang in propaganda
and recruitment videos
* Prior uprising or acts of aggression stemming from
Uighurs tended to occur in Xinjiang and related to the
control of cities or the territory

Step 4: Agent’s Actions
Contributing to the shift of the
later background

* In late 2001, the PRC shifted rhetoric from regarding the
Uighurs as a separatist threat to regarding Uighurs as parts
of active terrorist organizations.

Step 5: Possible Cause?

Yes. There is evidence that after the PRC targeted the
Uighurs as a population sympathetic to terrorist
organizations and enforced counterterrorism measures in
2008, there was an increase in the size and frequency of
terrorist attacks in China.
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Conclusion
The PRC’s actions in the late 2000s – current time frame contributed to the rise in Uighur
acts of religiously motivated terrorism in connections to Islamic Terrorist Groups (ITGs) such as
the Taliban, ISIS, and Al Qaeda. The PRC’s shift in rhetoric in 2001 describing Uighurs as parts
of active terrorist organizations proceeded legitimate terrorist attacks on the PRC’s homeland in
2008 and beyond. This background shift analysis provides a greater understanding of the causal
forces attributing to an increase in vulnerability in the Uighur population to sympathizing with
ITGs. It also provides a better understanding of how the PRC’s actions contributed to their issues
with the Uighurs and more specifically the connection between Uighurs and ITGs.
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Decision Significance Comparison
Decision significance comparison is a strategy assessment method used to interpret the
potential outcomes of a strategies against an identified key uncertainty. The method first requires
that two outcomes to a key uncertainty are identified. These two outcomes are then compared to
the list of potential strategies to determine what the environment would look like if the strategy
was implemented with each possible uncertainty. This first part creates a matrix that is then
utilized in interpreting the strategies. All strategies are interpreted as dominant options, maximin
options, maximax options, and minimax options. These interpretations give a more diverse
understanding of how implementing each strategy could play out in the future environment.
Decision Significance Comparison Method:
Potential Outcomes of a Key Uncertainty
The Uighurs ARE a
Radicalized Population
No Action Taken (over
human rights violations in
Xinjiang)

The Uighurs ARE NOT a
Radicalized Population

No action taken & the Uighurs
No action taken & the
are a radicalized population
Uighurs are not a radicalized
population

Firm Economic Sanctions
on the PRC (targeted at key
PRC economic interest; other
nations encouraged to do the
same)

Firm economic sanctions &
the Uighurs are a radicalized
population

Firm economic sanctions &
the Uighurs are not a
radicalized population

Firm Political Stance
Against the PRC’s Actions
(directly increasing
international pressure and
prompting other parties to act)

Firm political stance against
the PRC’s actions & the
Uighurs are a radicalized
population

Firm political stance against
the PRC’s action & the
Uighurs are not a radicalized
population

Forced Land Presence
within Xinjiang (for full
investigation of human rights
violations)

Forced land presence within
Xinjiang & the Uighurs are a
radicalized population

Forced land presence within
Xinjiang & the Uighurs are
not a radicalized population
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Decision Significance Comparison Method Continued:
Key Uncertainty: The Uighurs ARE a Radicalized Population vs. The Uighurs ARE NOT a
Radicalized Population

Option: No Action Taken (over human rights violations in Xinjiang)
How might is be interpreted
as a dominant option?
How might it be interpreted
as a maximin option?
How might it be interpreted
as a maximax option?
How might it be interpreted
as a minimax option?

No matter what, US maintains the ability to react according
to however the future environment unfolds.
Even if the Uighurs are a radicalized population and the US
doesn’t take action, then at least the PRC will not be angered
by the US’ prior involvement in the conflict.
If the Uighurs are not radicalized and the US does not take
action, then the US remains uninvolved in the conflict.
If the Uighurs are a radicalized population and the US does
not take action, while others are angered by the lack of action,
still the US would not have agitated the conflict between the
PRC and the radicalized population.

Option: Firm Economic Sanctions on the PRC (targeted at key PRC economic interest;
other nations encouraged to do the same)
How might is be interpreted
as a dominant option?
How might it be interpreted
as a maximin option?

How might it be interpreted
as a maximax option?
How might it be interpreted
as a minimax option?

No matter what, the US is responding to the human rights
violations.
Even if the Uighurs are radicalized and the economic
sanctions do not restrict human rights violations, then at least
the sanctions would likely not be strong enough to prevent
PRC response to radicalized terrorism.
If the Uighurs are not radicalized and the firm economic
sanctions were enforced, then the US will have successfully
supported Uighur human rights with little damaging action.
If the Uighurs are radicalized and the economic sanctions were
firmly enforced, while the PRC was angered by the sanctions,
still the US could reverse the sanctions and support the fight
against terrorism.
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Option: Firm Political Stance Against the PRC’s Actions (directly increasing international
pressure and prompting other parties to act)
How might is be interpreted
as a dominant option?
How might it be interpreted
as a maximin option?
How might it be interpreted
as a maximax option?

How might it be interpreted
as a minimax option?

No matter what, the US is responding strongly to human
rights violations in Xinjiang.
Even if the Uighurs are radicalized and the firm political
stance does not restrict human rights violations, then at least
the US did not take direct strong action against the PRC.
If the Uighurs are not radicalized and the firm political stance
worked to restrict human rights violations, then the US will
have strongly supported Uighur human rights with the support
of allied nations.
If the Uighurs are radicalized and the firm political stance
worked to restrict human rights violations, while the US and
allied nations helped liberate the Uighurs, still the US would
have greater information to intervene in the region.

Option: Forced Land Presence within Xinjiang (for full investigation of human rights
violations)
How might is be interpreted
as a dominant option?
How might it be interpreted
as a maximin option?

How might it be interpreted
as a maximax option?

How might it be interpreted
as a minimax option?

No matter what, the strong direct presence will aid in
eliminating some of the human rights violations and will
provide the US with actionable information.
Even if the Uighurs are radicalized and the US is directly
present in Xinjiang without alleviating the human rights
violations, then at least the US will have accurate insight into
the conflict.
If the Uighurs are not radicalized and the US is directly
present in Xinjiang, then the US will have strongly supported
Uighur human rights and directly contributed to the alleviation
of the human rights violations.
If the Uighurs are radicalized and the US is directly present
within Xinjiang, while the US will be forced to confront the
conflict, still the US would be prepared to do so and would
have an accurate perception of the situation in Xinjiang.
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Conclusion
Firm economic sanctions or a firm political stance could plausibly aid the US in
addressing the PRC’s human rights violations in Xinjiang. Action that does not involve the use
of force carries less of a risk in the event that the worst case scenario for the key uncertainty is
true and the Uighurs are a radicalized population. Both firm economic sanctions and a firm
political stance will allow the US to respond to human rights violations no matter what.
Assessing strategies fell outside the scope of the IA capstone project, but aided in the process of
identifying implications for the conclusion of the main project. The decision significance
comparison method specifically pointed to the implications for not responding in the face of the
human rights violations in Xinjiang and subsequently the different risks associated with different
types of responses. Decision significance comparison also helped highlight a key uncertainty for
acting in the future environment.

40
Key Assumptions Check
A key assumptions check is a technique utilized to identify certain key assumptions that
are important to the final judgments and were assumed throughout the analytical process. The
key assumptions are assessed based upon the evidence used in the analysis. The key assumptions
check was updated periodically throughout the course of the capstone project and always reevaluated after creating a new method or starting a new draft. The technique was used to
challenge underlying assumptions at several steps throughout the process as well as consider
alternative possibilities to the key assumptions.
Key Assumptions Check Method:
Key Assumption
The PRC does and will feel
pressured to explain its actions in
Xinjiang.
The Uighurs in Xinjiang do not
currently constitute a major
terrorism threat to the PRC.
The PRC is primarily concerned
with the strong non-Han identity
of the Uighur minority.
There are re-education camps in
Xinjiang that violate Uighur
human rights.

The main conflict between
Uighurs and the central PRC
government began over harsh
ethnic control policies and the
PAP’s actions.
The PRC intentionally
overestimated Uighur
connections to Islamic terrorist
organizations in the early 2000s.
The Uighurs in Xinjiang are a
major concern in PRC policies.
The PRC is intentionally
deceptive in their public
documents and news sources.

Assessment
High likely, given the amount of external pressure
being put on the PRC.
Likely, but there is still the possibility that they could
potentially pose a larger threat due to their positioning
in Xinjiang, ITG recruitment opportunities, and a few
past terrorist attacks on the PRC’s homeland.
Highly likely given ethnic control policies and their
past behaviors towards active minority groups.
However, the PRC also highly prioritizes keeping its
regions free of terrorist activity.
Likely given the satellite imagery and news stories
coming from Uighur refugees, but there is still a
possibility that the camps do not exist to the extent to
which is claimed in the media or that they solely
provide vocational training.
Highly likely given the lack of consistent evidence that
the Uighurs had a strong connection to Islamic Terrorist
Groups.

Possible, but there was a lot of fear over terrorism at the
time. Though the Uighurs may not have posed a terrorist
threat, the PRC could have perceived them to pose a
serious terrorist threat.
High likely given the amount of policies the PRC
created to force assimilation of the Uighurs.
Likely, given past behavior. There are true policies and
intentions woven within the white papers.
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Conclusion
A majority of the key assumptions were based upon the Uighur – PRC conflict being
primarily an ethnic conflict and not a terrorist threat. These key assumptions influenced key
judgments within the paper. The key assumptions check was used to highlight and consider the
alternative that the Uighurs could pose a valid threat to the PRC against all judgments made in
analyzing the methods. The key assumptions check also highlighted the possibility that main
piece of evidence for the existence of re-education camps in Xinjiang could not be sufficient
enough to prove that there are human rights violations occurring in these camps. This key
assumption led to the collection of more news sources to proceed with the analysis of the current
situation in Xinjiang.
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Honors Appendix 2: Ryan Walters
An Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) is a military intelligence process used
to direct intelligence and planning efforts through analysis of enemy threats and the operating
environment. Normally, the work is conducted by an Intelligence section within a battalion or
brigade over the course of several months using various technologies and techniques to compile
as comprehensive an idea of the enemy’s composition and potential plans as possible. Despite
having months of intelligence to use, the IPB is short and to the point, as the commander does
not normally have a lot of time to listen to hours of information. Normally, an IPB is presented in
a PowerPoint format so the intelligence officer has more flexibility to provide details as needed.
An IPB is broken up into five sections. Each section is short, only a couple paragraphs at
the most with some images to back up the assessment given. The first section is the friendly
unit’s mission. Including this ensures that the intelligence section is aware of what knowledge
their unit requires in order to accomplish their assigned tasks. In the case of this IPB, the
friendly unit will be NGIC. Next, the “Area of Operations” section details where the enemy
force is currently stationed and working. Pertinent details can include location of natural
resources, average weather conditions, and the terrain in the area. The “Enemy Situation”
section discusses what the intelligence section knows about the enemy. Here, the exact location,
armament, disposition, and other factors regarding the enemy’s current state are detailed. After
that is the “Enemy Capabilities” section provides estimates on what the enemy forces are
potentially capable of. This section predominantly focuses on potential courses of action that the
enemy could take and provides examples of possible indicators that would hint at each course of
action. Finally, the last section is a conclusion that summarizes the previous sections and
provides the commander with recommendations.
An IPB fit well as my Honors component for two main reasons. First, my focus of the
IPB was the People’s Armed Police (PAP), China’s national paramilitary police force. The PAP
is extremely active in Xinjiang, so learning more about the organization operates would greatly
increase my partner and I’s understanding of the PAP’s role in the main project. The IPB
methodology can easily be applied to the PAP, since the PAP is a military target. Second, IPBs
are extremely common in the Army. Doing an IPB for my Honors component made sense from
a professional standpoint, as getting a familiarization of the method and how it is conducted
would benefit me as I start my career as an Army officer.
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IPB
MISSION
NGIC focuses on the capabilities of foreign conventional and unconventional ground
forces. Analysis on the PAP’s capabilities and role in counterterrorism operations provides US
analysts and decisionmakers with information on how the PRC might react to terrorist actions
within their borders. Additionally, intelligence could be gathered to gain a further understanding
of how the PAP could be used to support conventional military operations within Chinese
borders.
AREA OF OPERATIONS
The People’s Republic of China is a large country, spanning 9,596,960 sq km with
mostly mountains, plateaus, and deserts in the West and plains and low-lying areas to the East.
Most of the population resides in heavily urbanized areas in the East. The sparsely populated
areas in the West are also home to large amounts of natural resources, such as oil and coal. As a
police force, the PAP maintains operations within Chinese borders. The PRC’s Area of Interest
and Influence extend further, but do not influence PAP operations as much.
ENEMY SITUATION
Chinese foreign policy is often quite defensive in nature due to the perceived
vulnerability of their borders. China’s borders are easier to attack than defend, leaving openings
for invasions or, in the counterterrorism perspective, infiltration. Many of the western mountains
and ridges would provide high ground for defending PAP forces to stage or defend, while relying
on China’s intricate railway system to transport troops and supplies all over the country as
needed.
Some key terrain for the PAP during counterterrorism operations would be the Tarim and
Junggar basins, the Three Gorges Water Project locations along the Yangtze River, and critical
infrastructure, such as the railways and powerplants. The basins are among the PRC’s key
sources for oil and coal, while the Three Gorges Water project provides electricity and water
supply to urban and rural areas along the lower and middle Yangtze River. Critical infrastructure
allow for life to continue as normal for both the defending forces and the Chinese civilians.
Damage or seizure of any of these locations could potentially cripple the Chinese defenses, so
the PAP will likely have responsibility for guarding and fortifying these sites.
ENEMY CAPABILITES
The PAP’s fourteen divisions and the PRC’s railway system allow for plenty of
flexibility in deployment around the country. The PAP also has exceptional signals intelligence
(SIGINT) collection technology, which has already been deployed in Xinjiang and other troubled
areas to limit spread of dissenting discussion. SIGINT capabilities are one area where the PAP
has significant opportunity for growth. Through control of the railways, the PAP can slow the
approach of any opposing forces that attempt to use the systems to travel across China quickly.
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The PAP has not always reacted well to emergency scenarios. Examples like the
Wenchuan earthquake in 2008 pinpointed weak areas in the PAP’s ability to respond quickly,
such as insufficient supplies and slow distribution. Errors in response could lead to a drop in
public opinion within the PRC, as could heavy handed tactics during PAP actions. Any fragility
in the confidence of the Chinese people could be weaponized by the opposition to halt wars or
government action, which forces Beijing to weigh options very carefully. The strengths of the
Chinese infrastructure also highlight the railways and SIGINT structures as potential high-profile
targets.
CONCLUSIONS
The PAP has three general strategies to utilize when faced with when deploying in
domestic counterterrorism operations. The most likely one is that the PAP maintains a constant
presence in their AO. Likely indicators of this would be the existence of patrols and checkpoints
to maintain order and encourage civilian participation in community policing, hardening
operations of both military and civilian targets, and PAP staging zones would be active with
troops, vehicles, and supplies moving in and out frequently.
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